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Impact of Increased Ethanol Mandates on Prices at the Pumpo
Abstract
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed in November to reduce 2014 biofuel mandates. One
concern expressed by EPA is that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to consume the 2014 target levels of
ethanol in the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) because of infrastructure issues. Difficulty in meeting ethanol
mandates is reflected into increased compliance costs and a measure of compliance cost is the price of the
tradable ethanol credit known as a RIN (Renewable Identification Number). The price of RINs represents the
gap between the cost of producing another gallon of ethanol and the price of ethanol that is needed to induce
consumers to buy another gallon. Compliance with the ethanol mandates falls to owners of oil refineries who
must purchase a specified number of RINs per gallon of gasoline produced. We show in previous work that
increasing the number of stations that sell E85 decreases the ethanol price discounts needed to induce enough
ethanol consumption to meet targets by making the fuel more accessible to consumers. Any reduction in
required discounts directly leads to lower RIN prices and hence lower compliance costs. Thus, obligated
parties faced with high RIN prices would have a strong incentive to invest in the infrastructure that would
facilitate increases in ethanol consumption.
As the cost of complying with RFS falls to owners of oil refineries, it is a natural position for them to oppose
any further increase in mandated ethanol volumes. One argument that has often been made by the oil industry
against increases in ethanol is that compliance costs will be passed on to consumers. This seems like a
reasonable argument because this type of cost increase in any economic model will tend to lead to higher
gasoline prices, hence higher consumer prices. Our objective in this study is to provide a transparent
economic analysis of the impact on consumer fuel prices from increased ethanol mandates. One feature of our
analysis is that it accounts for an increase in the consumption of E85, the most likely compliance path that
would be taken in 2014 to meet increases in ethanol mandates.
Each year, EPA establishes a percentage standard for ethanol by dividing the desired quantity of ethanol by the
total anticipated domestic sales of unblended gasoline. Each producer of gasoline has an RVO (Renewable
Volume Obligation) that is determined by multiplying the percentage standard by total domestic sales of
gasoline. The RVO is met by acquiring RINs. If an obligated party’s sales of gasoline increases, so too does the
RVO. This means that an obligated party can reduce the number of RINs that it needs to comply with the RFS
by decreasing the volume of gasoline sales. This direct link between the cost of RINs and gasoline sales implies
that increases in the cost of RINs reduces the quantity of gasoline that refiners will provide to consumers at
any given gasoline price.
Our model has separate demand curves for E10 and E85. The two demand curves are related because
increases in E85 consumption come at the expense of E10. The model calculates the retail price of E85 that is
needed to induce consumers to buy enough ethanol so that the number of RINs generated is adequate to meet
oil refineries’ RVO obligations. The obligations are met through increased E85 consumption and reduced E10
consumption. Increased E85 consumption can only occur with a lower retail price of E85. Given E10 and E85
prices, we can calculate the value at wholesale for gasoline and ethanol. It is the difference between the value
of ethanol at wholesale and the cost of producing the required quantity of ethanol that determines the RIN
price. The compliance cost to oil refineries per gallon of gasoline is the product of the RIN price and the
percentage standard.
We find two direct effects of a binding ethanol mandate. The first is an increase in the wholesale price of
gasoline because positive RIN prices increase the cost of producing gasoline. The second is a decrease in the
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_policybriefs/6
ethanol price paid by blenders net of the RIN value. The net price of ethanol will decrease to induce
consumers to consume enough ethanol to meet the mandate. Because most US consumers buy E10, the lower
price of ethanol in the blend offsets at least some portion of the increased gasoline price. In addition to these
two direct effects on the price of E10, there exists an indirect effect that works to lower E10 prices. To meet
mandates beyond E10 requires an increase in E85 consumption, which results in a decrease in E10
consumption because some owners of flex vehicles switch fuels. The effect of substituting E85 for E10 is a net
decrease in gasoline demand, which results in some reduction in wholesale gasoline prices. Whether the net
effect of these three market forces results in a net increase or decrease in E10 pump prices requires the
development of an economic model to sort out.
We developed and calibrated such a model with the purpose of showing how feasible increases in ethanol
blending mandates will affect the price of E10 under a range of possible conditions. We find that feasible
increases in the ethanol mandate in 2014 will cause a small decline in the price of E10. That is, even though
increased mandates increase gasoline prices, the offsetting effects from a decline in ethanol price and
movement by motorists to E85 from E10 are enough to result in a net decrease in the price of E10.
Our results should reassure those in Congress and the Administration who are worried that following the RFS
commitment to expanding the use of renewable fuels will result in sharply higher fuel prices for consumers.
There may be sound policy reasons that could justify Congress revisiting the RFS. However, concern about
higher pump prices for consumers is not one of them.
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Energy
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Executive Summary 
 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed in November to reduce 2014 
biofuel mandates. One concern expressed by EPA is that it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to consume the 2014 target levels of ethanol in the Renewable Fuel Standard 
(RFS) because of infrastructure issues. Difficulty in meeting ethanol mandates is 
reflected into increased compliance costs and a measure of compliance cost is the price 
of the tradable ethanol credit known as a RIN (Renewable Identification Number). The 
price of RINs represents the gap between the cost of producing another gallon of ethanol 
and the price of ethanol that is needed to induce consumers to buy another gallon. 
Compliance with the ethanol mandates falls to owners of oil refineries who must 
purchase a specified number of RINs per gallon of gasoline produced. We show in 
previous work that increasing the number of stations that sell E85 decreases the ethanol 
price discounts needed to induce enough ethanol consumption to meet targets by 
making the fuel more accessible to consumers. Any reduction in required discounts 
directly leads to lower RIN prices and hence lower compliance costs. Thus, obligated 
parties faced with high RIN prices would have a strong incentive to invest in the 
infrastructure that would facilitate increases in ethanol consumption. 
 
As the cost of complying with RFS falls to owners of oil refineries, it is a natural position 
for them to oppose any further increase in mandated ethanol volumes. One argument 
that has often been made by the oil industry against increases in ethanol is that 
compliance costs will be passed on to consumers. This seems like a reasonable argument 
because this type of cost increase in any economic model will tend to lead to higher 
gasoline prices, hence higher consumer prices. Our objective in this study is to provide a 
transparent economic analysis of the impact on consumer fuel prices from increased 
ethanol mandates. One feature of our analysis is that it accounts for an increase in the 
consumption of E85, the most likely compliance path that would be taken in 2014 to 
meet increases in ethanol mandates.  
 
Each year, EPA establishes a percentage standard for ethanol by dividing the desired 
quantity of ethanol by the total anticipated domestic sales of unblended gasoline. Each 
producer of gasoline has an RVO (Renewable Volume Obligation) that is determined by 
multiplying the percentage standard by total domestic sales of gasoline. The RVO is met 
by acquiring RINs. If an obligated party’s sales of gasoline increases, so too does the 
RVO. This means that an obligated party can reduce the number of RINs that it needs to 
comply with the RFS by decreasing the volume of gasoline sales. This direct link between 
the cost of RINs and gasoline sales implies that increases in the cost of RINs reduces the 
quantity of gasoline that refiners will provide to consumers at any given gasoline price.  
 
Our model has separate demand curves for E10 and E85. The two demand curves are 
related because increases in E85 consumption come at the expense of E10. The model 
calculates the retail price of E85 that is needed to induce consumers to buy enough 
ethanol so that the number of RINs generated is adequate to meet oil refineries’ RVO 
obligations. The obligations are met through increased E85 consumption and reduced 
E10 consumption. Increased E85 consumption can only occur with a lower retail price of 
E85. Given E10 and E85 prices, we can calculate the value at wholesale for gasoline and 
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ethanol. It is the difference between the value of ethanol at wholesale and the cost of 
producing the required quantity of ethanol that determines the RIN price. The 
compliance cost to oil refineries per gallon of gasoline is the product of the RIN price and 
the percentage standard. 
 
We find two direct effects of a binding ethanol mandate. The first is an increase in the 
wholesale price of gasoline because positive RIN prices increase the cost of producing 
gasoline. The second is a decrease in the ethanol price paid by blenders net of the RIN 
value. The net price of ethanol will decrease to induce consumers to consume enough 
ethanol to meet the mandate. Because most US consumers buy E10, the lower price of 
ethanol in the blend offsets at least some portion of the increased gasoline price. In 
addition to these two direct effects on the price of E10, there exists an indirect effect that 
works to lower E10 prices. To meet mandates beyond E10 requires an increase in E85 
consumption, which results in a decrease in E10 consumption because some owners of 
flex vehicles switch fuels. The effect of substituting E85 for E10 is a net decrease in 
gasoline demand, which results in some reduction in wholesale gasoline prices. Whether 
the net effect of these three market forces results in a net increase or decrease in E10 
pump prices requires the development of an economic model to sort out.  
 
We developed and calibrated such a model with the purpose of showing how feasible 
increases in ethanol blending mandates will affect the price of E10 under a range of 
possible conditions. We find that feasible increases in the ethanol mandate in 2014 will 
cause a small decline in the price of E10. That is, even though increased mandates 
increase gasoline prices, the offsetting effects from a decline in ethanol price and 
movement by motorists to E85 from E10 are enough to result in a net decrease in the 
price of E10. 
 
Our results should reassure those in Congress and the Administration who are worried 
that following the RFS commitment to expanding the use of renewable fuels will result in 
sharply higher fuel prices for consumers. There may be sound policy reasons that could 
justify Congress revisiting the RFS. However, concern about higher pump prices for 
consumers is not one of them. 
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Impact of Increased Ethanol Mandates on Prices at the 
Pump 
 
By Sebastien Pouliot and Bruce A. Babcock 
 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed in November to reduce 2014 
biofuel mandates. One concern expressed by EPA is that it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to consume the 2014 target levels of ethanol in the Renewable Fuel Standard 
(RFS) because of infrastructure issues. In a recent paper, we addressed this issue by 
showing how the infrastructure issues could be resolved through investments by 
obligated parties incentivized by the lower compliance costs that such investments would 
facilitate.1 A measure of compliance cost is the price of the tradable ethanol credit known 
as a RIN (Renewable Identification Number). The price of RINs represents the gap 
between the cost of producing another gallon of ethanol and the price of ethanol that is 
needed to induce consumers to buy another gallon. To induce consumption of more 
ethanol than is contained in a 10 percent blend (E10) requires a drop in the price of 
ethanol. This drop in ethanol price increases the price of RINs because it increases the 
gap between production costs and consumer value. An increase in the price of RINs 
increases the cost of complying with ethanol mandates. These costs are borne by owners 
of oil refineries. Increasing the number of stations that sell E85 and E15 decreases the 
ethanol price discounts needed to induce enough ethanol consumption to meet targets 
by making the fuel more accessible to consumers. Any reduction in required discounts 
directly leads to lower RIN prices and hence lower compliance costs. Thus, obligated 
parties faced with high RIN prices would have a strong incentive to invest in the 
infrastructure that would facilitate increases in ethanol consumption. 
 
It is no surprise that owners of oil refineries would balk at being forced to facilitate 
mandated consumption of a fuel that they do not produce by making investments in 
gasoline stations that they do not own. Thus, their trade associations have mounted a 
strong lobbying effort to get Congress and the Administration to repeal or reduce ethanol 
mandates. The proposed EPA rule that would allow ethanol mandates to be met with E10 
represents a significant policy change that reflects the success of the industry at exerting 
political pressure in Washington. 
 
One argument that the oil industry uses in its campaign against RFS mandates is that 
high compliance costs would lead to significant increases in pump prices for consumers. 
For example, Tom O’Malley, chairman of PBF Energy, is quoted in a Reuters article as 
saying that the price of RINs is a hidden tax on consumers because his company will 
have to pass the rising costs of RINs on to consumers.2 Mr. O’Malley is also quoted in a 
Platts article as saying, “This price increase will be passed along to consumers, raising 
the pump price…”3 This argument would seem to have economic merit because it is 
usually the case that cost-increasing government regulations will eventually result in 
higher consumer prices. It is clear that high RIN prices are a cost borne by producers of 
gasoline (the owners of oil refineries). Furthermore, because each barrel of gasoline 
                                                 
1 See Babcock, B.A., and S. Pouliot. (2014). “Feasibility and Cost of Increasing Ethanol Consumption 
Beyond E10.” 14 PB-17 Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University. 
2Article available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/pbf-earnings-rins-
idUSL2N0DJ23820130502. 
3 Platts. April 20, 2013. “RINs are a disaster for US consumers: PBF Energy chairman.” Article available at 
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/newyork/rins-are-a-disaster-for-us-consumers-pbf-energy-21944290. 
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produced results in the need to buy more RINs for compliance, it is a variable cost that 
directly increases the cost of producing gasoline. This type of cost increase in any 
economic model will tend to lead to higher gasoline prices, hence higher consumer 
prices. 
 
According to other press reports, the concern about high RIN prices was also expressed 
by White House officials who weighed in on the review of EPA’s proposed rules. Amanda 
Peterka reported on January 6, 2014 that Office of Management and Budget reviewers 
wrote “If volumes are too low, no harm no foul. If volumes are too high, then the prices 
of RINs will be high and we will face a real problem.”4 Peterka’s article did not detail 
exactly what problems high RIN prices were supposed to lead to, but lower profits for oil 
companies or higher pump prices for consumers seem likely. 
 
The extent to which an increase in the cost of producing gasoline will lead to a change in 
pump prices depends on many factors. One cannot conclude that pump prices will 
increase simply because owners of refineries have to comply with a costly regulation. The 
fuel that most drivers use today contains 10 percent ethanol. Thus, at a minimum, one 
needs to account for the effects of compliance with ethanol mandates on the price of 
ethanol. After all, high RIN prices reflect low consumer ethanol prices which will tend to 
decrease pump prices, not increase them. 
 
The purpose of this study is to estimate the impact of RIN prices on the pump price of 
fuel. Estimates are made for a wide range of price sensitivities of supply and demand, 
RIN prices, and ethanol mandates. Rather than attempt to sort out the effects of RIN 
prices on pump prices using historical data, we instead build a standard economic model 
that takes into account the cost of producing ethanol, the consumer demand for 
transportation fuel, and the cost of producing gasoline. We assume that ethanol 
producers, fuel blenders, and gasoline producers are perfectly competitive, which simply 
means that they do not attempt to manipulate prices in their favor. The next section 
describes this model in some detail. 
 
Our objective in writing this paper is to provide a transparent economic analysis of the 
impact on consumer fuel prices from mandates that increase the consumption of 
ethanol. We hope that the findings of this paper will contribute to the ongoing RFS 
debate by allowing involved parties to focus on whether the policy objectives of 
expanding use of renewable fuels are being met with the RFS in a cost-effective manner. 
As we demonstrate here, one of the costs that does not need to be considered is an 
increase in the pump price of fuel, because we show that the most likely outcome from 
increasing ethanol mandates is a drop in pump prices, not an increase. 
 
The Model  
To simulate the impact of RIN prices on fuel costs requires a model of how fuel prices are 
determined. The first step is to determine which fuels will be modeled. The focus of this 
study is on ethanol. In its proposed rule the EPA would mandate that nearly every gallon 
of gasoline should contain 10 percent ethanol. Thus, one of the fuels we model is E10. 
Two fuels—E85 and E15—could be used for compliance if EPA were to mandate ethanol 
consumption beyond levels that can be consumed with E10. We assume that E85 would 
be used for compliance so that we can build on our earlier work on the consumer 
                                                 
4 Peterka, A. Jan. 6, 2014. “White House urged EPA restraint on 2014 RFS targets.” Available at 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059992426. 
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demand for E85.5 The model accounts for fuel substitution because consumers that use 
E85 to fuel their cars do not use E10.  
 
We simplify how RFS obligations are established by focusing solely on ethanol. We 
assume that EPA establishes a percentage standard for ethanol by dividing the desired 
quantity of ethanol by the total anticipated domestic sales of unblended gasoline. 
Therefore, if EPA has a target of 13.5 billion gallons of ethanol and anticipates that 
domestic sales of gasoline will be 121 billion gallons then the percentage standard will be 
11.16 percent. Each producer of gasoline has an RVO (Renewable Volume Obligation) 
that is determined by multiplying the percentage standard by total domestic sales of 
gasoline. The RVO is met by acquiring RINs. If an obligated party’s sales of gasoline 
increases, so too does the RVO. This means that an obligated party can reduce the 
number of RINs that it needs to comply with the RFS by decreasing the volume of 
gasoline sales. This direct link between the cost of RINs and gasoline sales implies that 
increases in the cost of RINs reduces the quantity of gasoline that refiners will provide to 
consumers at any given gasoline price. Figure 1 shows the impact of the obligation on a 
hypothetical gasoline supply curve. Each additional gallon of gasoline sold domestically 
increase refinery costs by the product of the RIN price and the percentage standard. 
With a percentage standard of 11.16 percent and a RIN price of $1.00, the gasoline 
supply curve shifts up by 11.16 cents per gallon. That is, the supply of gasoline shifts up 
an amount equal to the product of the percentage standard and the RIN price. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Impact of RFS obligation on supply curve of gasoline 
 
                                                 
5 See Babcock, B.A., and S. Pouliot. (2013). “Price It and They Will Buy: How E85 Can Break the Blend Wall.” 
13-PB 11. Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University. 
Quantity of 
Gasoline
Price of 
Gasoline
Supply no RVO
Supply with RVO
Price of RINs X percentage standard
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Figure 2 shows the impact of this shift on the wholesale price of gasoline by adding a 
downward sloping gasoline demand curve. The shift up in the supply curve of gasoline 
increases the market-clearing price of gasoline from P1 to P2 and decreases the quantity 
sold from Q1 to Q2. This result means that faced with the added cost from RINs, oil 
refineries will reduce the quantity of gasoline sold, which will also reduce the number of 
RINs that they need to turn into EPA. Note that the magnitude of the price increase is 
less than the cost increase. This means that some of the cost increase is borne by buyers 
of wholesale gasoline and some by gasoline producers. This is a standard result in 
economic analyses that try to estimate the impact of a tax on production. Producers bear 
more of the impact when their quantity supplied is less sensitive to a price increase than 
the quantity demanded by consumers. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Impact of RFS obligation on wholesale price of gasoline 
 
However, consumers do not consume pure gasoline—our model assumes that they 
consume either E10 or E85. Therefore, we need to account for the change in equilibrium 
ethanol prices as well as equilibrium gasoline prices. It is not really possible to show in 
simple supply and demand diagrams how the model finds market-clearing prices 
because of interdependencies between the demand for E10 and E85. Nor is it possible to 
derive an-easy-to-understand algebraic formula to characterize how E10 price changes 
as mandates and RIN prices increase. However, a description of the economic factors 
that determine how E10 prices are impacted will be useful.  
 
Our model has separate demand curves for E10 and E85. The two demand curves are 
related because increases in E85 consumption come at the expense of E10. The model 
calculates the retail price of E85 that is needed to induce consumers to buy enough 
ethanol so that the number of RINs generated is adequate to meet oil refineries’ RVO 
obligations. The obligations are met through increased E85 consumption and reduced 
E10 consumption. Increased E85 consumption can only occur with a lower retail price of 
E85. Given our assumption of a fixed markup between wholesale and retail prices, we 
Quantity of 
Gasoline
Price of 
Gasoline
Supply no RVO
Supply with RVO
Demand
Q1Q2
P2
P1
Price of RINs X 
percentage standard
 8 CARD Policy Briefs 
can calculate what wholesale price of E85 corresponds to the required retail price. Given 
a wholesale gasoline price, we can then calculate the required wholesale ethanol price 
because we assume that E85 contains no more than 75 percent ethanol. The difference 
between the required wholesale price of ethanol and the cost of producing the required 
quantity of ethanol equals our model’s RIN price. Because we treat ethanol as a 
commodity product, we only have one wholesale price of ethanol. This wholesale price of 
ethanol equals the plant price (including ethanol transportation costs) minus the RIN 
price. 
 
The quantity of ethanol that is needed to meet the aggregate obligations of gasoline 
producers is split between E85 and E10. The obligation to meet blending mandates and 
the position of the E85 demand curve are the primary factors that determine how much 
E85 is consumed, how much E10 is consumed, and the wholesale price of ethanol. 
Starting from an equilibrium situation, an increase in the percentage standard will 
increase E85 consumption and reduce E10 consumption. Each gallon of reduced E10 
consumption reduces gasoline consumption by 0.9 gallons. Each gallon of increased E85 
consumption increases gasoline consumption by 0.25 gallons. Even after accounting for 
the reduced energy content of E85 there will be a net decrease in the domestic demand 
for gasoline from a move to E85. With reference to Figure 2, this reduction in gasoline 
demand would result in a leftward shift in the demand for gasoline and will result in a 
lower equilibrium gasoline price than P2. Our model’s E10 price equals 90 percent of the 
gasoline price plus 10 percent of the ethanol price and a fixed margin to retailers. Thus, 
the likely net increase in the gasoline price will tend to increase E10 prices. 
 
An increase in blending requirement necessarily reduces the wholesale ethanol price. 
This means that at least some portion of the increased E10 price from higher wholesale 
gasoline prices will be offset by lower ethanol prices. It is possible that the wholesale 
ethanol price will decline enough to actually reduce E10 prices. The purpose of our 
model is to show how feasible increases in blending mandates will affect the price of E10 
under a range of possible conditions. Results from model simulations are presented next.  
 
Simply put, we can summarize the impact of an increase in the ethanol mandate on the 
price of E10 by three forces: (a) a decrease in the price of E10 because of a decrease in 
the wholesale price of ethanol; (b) a decrease in the price of E10 because of substitution 
by motorists of from E10 to cheaper E85; and (c) an increase in the price of E10 because 
of an increase in the wholesale price of gasoline. At equilibrium, the relative magnitude 
of these three forces will determine the impact of the mandate on the price of E10. In the 
next section, we calibrate and solve our model to gauge whether an increase in the 
ethanol mandate has a positive or negative impact on the price of E10. 
 
Model outcomes 
Table 1 shows the calibration that anchors our model. The calibration of the model is 
based on the price of E10, the quantity of E10, and the wholesale price of gasoline 
obtained from the latest Energy Information Agency (EIA) Short-Term Energy Outlook 
for 2014.6 The model accounts for ethanol plants selling ethanol to blenders who buy 
refinery-produced gasoline. Blenders blend gasoline and ethanol in fixed proportions to 
produce E10 and E85. We fix the proportion of ethanol in E85 at 75 percent.7 The 
                                                 
6 See EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/. 
7 In its predictions, the US Energy Information Administration assumes that E85 contains 74 percent 
ethanol (see footnote 8 in http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/tablebrowser/#release=AEO2013&subject=0-
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wholesale price of blended fuel equals the share-weighted wholesale prices of gasoline 
and ethanol. The retail price of blended fuel equals the wholesale cost plus a fixed 
markup of 75 cents per gallon.8 The demand curve for E10 is calibrated to demand 
elasticities that range from -0.1 to -0.4, a retail price of $3.46 per gallon, and a quantity 
of 134.9 billion gallons. The supply curve of gasoline is calibrated to supply elasticities 
that range from 0.15 to 0.5, a wholesale price of $2.78 per gallon, and a quantity of 121 
billion gallons. The demand curve for E85 is taken directly from our previous studies and 
is calibrated to result in 130 million gallons of consumption at an E85 price of $3.45 per 
gallon. 
 
Our model is calibrated such that when all fuel sold contains at least 10 percent ethanol 
and a small amount of E85 is sold, then the ethanol mandate is not binding and the RIN 
price will be zero. We extrapolate from Minnesota data on consumption of E85 for 
2013,9 and make the mandate not binding at a consumption of about 130 million gallons 
of E85 for the entire United States in 2014. From our previous estimate of US demand 
for E85, we find a market-clearing price of $3.45 per gallon for E85. The model assumes 
constant elasticity functional forms for the demand for E10 and for the supply of 
gasoline. The elasticity of demand -0.25 for E10 gasoline is from Lin and Prince (2013) 10 
and the elasticity of supply of 0.29 for gasoline is from Coyle, DeBacker, and Prisinzano 
(2012).11 We calculate from our model of demand for E85 that the cross-price elasticity 
of demand for E10 by owners of FFVs with respect to the price of E85 is 0.31. The 
ultimate impact of a change in the price of E85 on the demand for E10 requires that this 
cross-price elasticity be multiplied by the ratio of FFVs to total vehicles. Given that there 
are about 16 million FFVs out of a US vehicle fleet of about 244 million, it results in a 
cross-price elasticity of demand for E10 with respect to the price of E85 of 0.02. The 
demand for E85 and its sensitivity with respect to the price of E10 is from our earlier 
work.12 The supply curve for corn ethanol used in this study was taken from an earlier 
paper by Babcock.13 At an ethanol price of $2.00 per gallon, the quantity produced is 13 
billion gallons.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
AEO2013&table=2-AEO2013&region=1-0&cases=ref2013-d102312a). We use 75 percent in our model to be 
consistent with our prior work. The impact of the one percent difference in the results is negligible. 
8 This markup was estimated from a simple linear regression of average US retail wholesale gasoline prices 
on average wholesale gasoline prices. The intercept from this regression was approximately 0.75 and the 
slope was approximately 1.0. The results of this regression suggest that the proportional taxes that are 
assessed on blended transportation fuel are dominated by the fixed taxes and markup formulas.  
9 See the Minnesota E85 + mid-blends station report at http://mn.gov/commerce/energy/images/E-85-
Fuel-Use-Data.pdf 
10 Lin, C.-Y. and Lea Prince. (2013). “Gasoline Price Volatility and the Elasticity of Demand for Gasoline.” 
Energy Economics 38: 111-117. 
11 Coyle, D., J. Debacker, and R. Prisinzano. (2012). “Estimating the supply and demand of gasoline using tax 
data.” Energy Economics 34: 195-200. 
12 See Babcock, B.A., and S. Pouliot. (2013). “Price It and They Will Buy: How E85 Can Break the Blend 
Wall.” 13-PB 11. Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University. 
13 See Babcock, B.A. (2013). “RFS Compliance Costs and Incentives to Invest in Ethanol Infrastructure.” 13-
PB 13 Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, September, 2013. 
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Table 1. Model Calibration 
Price of E10 $3.46/gal EIA 
Price of E85 $3.45/gal Author calculation 
Quantity of E10 134.9B 
gal 
EIA 
Quantity of E85 130M gal Author calculation 
Wholesale Price of gasoline $2.78/gal EIA 
Elasticity of demand for E10 -0.25 Lin and Prince (2013) 
Cross-price elasticity of E10 for E85 
price 
0.02 Author calculation 
Elasticity of supply of gasoline 0.29 Coyle, DeBacker and Prisinzano 
(2012) 
Price of RIN $0.00/gal  Author calculation 
 
 
The model is derived assuming that all motor gasoline contains 10 percent ethanol. In 
practice, however, evidence shows that about four billion gallons of regular gasoline does 
not contain any ethanol. To account for this, we adjusted the volumes of ethanol by 
subtracting ten percent of 4 billion gallons. The mandated volumes that we consider are 
net of any banked RINs applied to 2014 mandated volumes. 
 
Table 2 shows outcomes of the model for mandated ethanol volumes between 13 and 
13.8 billion gallons. For volumes of 13 and 13.1 billion gallons the mandate does not bind 
and the price of RINs equal zero. At those volumes, the model yields results that are very 
close to the values used for the calibration. Prices for E10 and E85 equal the values 
selected for the calibration, but the quantity of E10 is slightly below the 134.9 billion 
gallons used for the calibration and the quantity of E85 is slightly above the volumes 
used for the calibration. 
 
 
Table 2. Impact of Fuel Prices and Quantities from Different Mandate Levels  
Mandate 
(billion 
gal) 
Quantity of 
ethanol 
(billion gal) 
Price of 
E10 
($/gal) 
Price of 
E85 
($/gal) 
Quantity of 
E10 
(billion gal) 
Quantity of 
E85 
(billion gal) 
Price of 
RIN 
($/gal) 
13.0 13.188 3.46 3.45 134.8 0.141 0.00 
13.1 13.188 3.46 3.45 134.8 0.143 0.00 
13.2 13.194 3.46 3.43 134.8 0.155 0.13 
13.3 13.285 3.45 3.25 134.7 0.287 0.23 
13.4 13.376 3.45 3.09 134.5 0.425 0.42 
13.5 13.469 3.45 2.97 134.5 0.563 0.56 
13.6 13.561 3.44 2.85 134.4 0.700 0.70 
13.7 13.649 3.44 2.70 134.2 0.838 0.89 
13.8 13.731 3.43 2.49 134.0 0.975 1.12 
 
 
The ethanol mandate begins to bind at 13.2 billion gallons as reflected by RIN prices that 
increase with respect to mandated volumes. A large RIN price reflects a low consumer 
value for the ethanol that enters into the production of E10 and E85. Greater ethanol 
mandates are met by a decline in the price of E85 which causes increased consumption 
of E85. Greater volumes of E85 decrease the demand for E10 causing a small decline in 
the consumption of E10. This downward shift in the demand for E10 and lower 
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wholesale prices for ethanol are sufficient to offset the increase in the price of gasoline 
caused by RIN prices as illustrated in Figure 2. Thus, the price of E10 declines from 
$3.46 per gallon at a mandate of 13.2 billion gallons to $3.43 per gallon at a mandate of 
13.8 billion gallons. 
 
Observe that ethanol consumption in equilibrium never quite equals the mandated 
volumes when the mandate is binding. This is expected because the RVO is specified as a 
percentage of gasoline sales. As increased consumption of ethanol in E85 displaces 
volumes of gasoline from consumption of gasoline in E10, the total volumes of gasoline 
are below the volumes for which the percentage standard is calculated from.  
 
Table 3 shows model results for alternative values of the elasticity of demand for E10 and 
the elasticity of supply for gasoline. We do not show results for non-binding volumes of 
ethanol because the outcomes of the model are near its calibration and thus are 
essentially the same results as those in table 2. We report results when the mandate on 
ethanol is binding for 13.4 and 13.8 billion gallons of ethanol. Overall, the results are not 
sensitive to these ranges of elasticities. In particular, our finding that increases in 
ethanol mandates decrease the price of E10 holds over this range of elasticities.  
 
 
Table 3. Sensitivity of Results to Alternative Values of Elasticities 
 
 
Results in Tables 2 and 3 are derived assuming a price of corn consistent with current 
corn futures prices. These prices reflect what the market believes corn prices will be for 
2014 given prevailing market conditions and under the expectation that corn yields will 
be near trend yields. However, if 2014 corn yields fall much below expected levels then 
the impact of ethanol mandates on E10 prices will be different from those presented 
above. 
 
Recall that there are three main forces affecting E10 prices when considering changes in 
ethanol mandates. Changes in corn yields do not affect the value of ethanol to blenders 
and do not affect the ability of drivers to switch between E10 and E85, so these two 
factors remain constant. A decline in corn yields would increase corn prices, which 
would increase the cost of producing ethanol. This increase in production costs would 
Mandate 
(billion 
gal) 
Quantity of 
ethanol 
(billion gal) 
Price of 
E10 
($/gal) 
Price of 
E85 
($/gal) 
Quantity of 
E10 
(billion gal) 
Quantity of 
E85 
(billion gal) 
Price of 
RIN 
($/gal) 
Elasticity of E10 demand = -0.10; Elasticity of gasoline supply = 0.29 
13.4 13.371 3.45 3.09 134.5 0.424 0.41 
13.8 13.714 3.42 2.48 133.8 0.973 1.13 
Elasticity of E10 demand = -0.40; Elasticity of gasoline supply = 0.29 
13.4 13.380 3.45 3.10 134.6 0.426 0.32 
13.8 13.741 3.44 2.49 134.1 0.975 1.13 
Elasticity of E10 demand = -0.25; Elasticity of gasoline supply = 0.10 
13.4 13.387 3.44 3.09 134.7 0.425 0.42 
13.8 13.761 3.41 2.46 134.3 0.977 1.15 
Elasticity of E10 demand = -0.25; Elasticity of gasoline supply = 0.50 
13.4 13.372 3.45 3.10 134.5 0.425 0.34 
13.8 13.717 3.44 2.50 133.9 0.974 1.12 
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increase RIN prices, which would then cause a larger shift in the gasoline supply curve. 
Gasoline producers would reduce gasoline production by a greater amount and the 
equilibrium price of gasoline would increase by a greater amount than we assume in our 
results. Under these conditions, it is possible that the cost to gasoline producers of 
complying with the ethanol mandates is large enough to result in enough of a contraction 
in gasoline supply to result in a net increase in the price of E10. 
 
In contrast, if the 2014 corn crop is a bumper crop, then corn prices, ethanol production 
costs, and RIN prices would all be lower than assumed in our results. Lower RIN prices 
would result in a smaller cost increase to gasoline producers. Gasoline prices would 
therefore increase by a smaller amount than assumed in our results. The net effect would 
be a larger drop in E10 prices than estimated here.  
 
Implications and Interpretation 
Our assessment that the pump price of E10 would actually fall if EPA increases 2014 
mandates under current market conditions seems to belie common sense. After all, how 
can a regulation that increases the cost of producing gasoline result in lower fuel prices? 
The reason for this counterintuitive result is that gasoline producers do not produce the 
fuel that consumers buy. Gasoline producers sell their product to blenders who also buy 
ethanol to produce E10 and E85, which is then purchased by consumers. An increase in 
the ethanol mandate can only be met through expanded consumption of E85. To induce 
owners of FFVs to use E85 requires a lower ethanol price. Because ethanol is a 
commodity, this lower price is also reflected in the cost of producing E10, which in our 
model with perfectly competitive markets, tends to reduce E10 prices. The same market 
forces that would cause gasoline prices to increase in response to increased costs of 
complying with biofuel mandates would decrease ethanol prices. Therefore, even though 
increased mandates increase gasoline prices, the offsetting effects from a decline in 
ethanol price and substitution by motorists to E85 are enough to result in a net decrease 
in the price of E10. Hence, under our maintained assumption that markets are perfectly 
competitive, the pump price of E10 will drop because of increase ethanol mandates.  
 
A number of academic studies have pointed out that mandating ethanol use can decrease 
fuel prices.14 Thus, our result that increasing mandates lowering E10 prices should not 
be too surprising. However, the academic literature is not typically referenced in the 
political arena where ethanol policy is debated. The oil industry continues to rely on their 
own commissioned study (NERA 2012)15 that predicts gasoline producers will have no 
choice but to cut domestic sales of gasoline to reduce their obligations under the RFS. 
The NERA finding is consistent with our results in that the RVO increases the cost of 
producing gasoline. However, the NERA study does not account for the ability to 
generate enough RINs through expansion of the demand for E85 to meet expanded 
mandates. The study’s conclusions—that expansion of ethanol mandates would cause 
severe damage to the economy—are simply not credible unless EPA were to ignore set 
mandates at such a high level that they literally could not be met regardless of the level of 
investment in new fueling infrastructure.  
 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Cui, J., H. Lapan, G. Moschini, and J. Cooper. (2010). “Welfare impacts of 
Alternative Biofuel and Energy Policies.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 93(5): 1235-
1256  
15 NERA Economic Consulting. (2012). “Economic Impacts Resulting from Implementation of RFS2 
Program.” 
 13 CARD Policy Briefs 
The results of this paper should reassure those in Congress and the Administration who 
are worried that following the RFS commitment to expanding the use of renewable fuels 
will result in sharply higher fuel prices for consumers. Under normal corn yields, instead 
of increasing prices, expanding use of renewable fuels will result in a modest decrease in 
pump prices. Of course this decrease must be paid for by somebody. With the RFS in 
place, this price decrease is paid for by owners of oil refineries. This transfer from the oil 
industry to fuel consumers is the reason why the oil industry has lobbied hard to stop 
ethanol mandates from expanding further.16  
 
There may be sound policy reasons that could justify Congress revisiting the RFS. 
However, concern about higher pump prices for consumers is not one of them. Other 
arguments often put forth by biofuel opponents concerning significant impacts of 
expanded biofuel production on consumer food prices and the lack of ability to consume 
quantities of ethanol beyond E10 similarly lack a solid economic foundation. The reason 
the oil industry and much of the livestock industry have joined forces against biofuels is 
one of simple industry economics: their industries would benefit from cheap corn and 
reduced competition from ethanol. Rather than taking sides with different industry 
groups in this policy debate, Congress and the Administration should focus on whether 
the benefits of increasing renewable fuels by reducing fossil fuels are worth the costs. If 
they are then support for renewable fuels should not be abandoned. If they are not, then 
the sooner that resources are allocated to other, higher value uses, the better. 
 
 
                                                 
16 The size of the transfer can be approximated from the results in Table 2. With the 13.8 billion gallon 
mandate and a RIN price of $1.12, the total value of RINs equals $15.44 billion. The benefit of higher 
gasoline prices to oil refineries offsets $10.5 billion of this amount. The benefit to fuel consumers is $2.2 
billion. The benefit to ethanol producers is $670 million.  
